In a BIRODI survey conducted in late November 2015 (N=117), the question of Serbia’s capital produced a twofold picture: Belgrade still enjoys majority support as the capital, but at the same time a large share of respondents send a clear message that “the problem is not the capital’s address, but the centralization of the state.”
Asked directly whether Belgrade should remain the capital, 62.4% answered yes, while 29.1% said it should not. Another 7.7% had no opinion, and only 0.9% chose “something else,” adding a comment that the question was meaningless. So, changing the capital is not the dominant preference—but nearly a third of respondents still bring the idea into serious discussion.
When respondents were asked which city could become a new capital, the results reveal a split between “institutional candidates” and a protest against the idea itself. Among the suggested cities, Novi Sad performed best (29.9%), followed by Kragujevac (19.7%) and Niš (12.0%). However, the largest share selected “something else” (38.5%)—and comments show that this option often served as a message in itself: “Belgrade should stay” or “none,” alongside a number of satirical or protest entries. In other words, some respondents used the question to reject the whole “capital relocation” framing rather than to propose a real alternative.
In open-ended responses, arguments cluster into three lines. The first is “realist”: Belgrade is the largest city, the most prepared in infrastructure terms, and the historical center of institutions. The second is “regional”: Novi Sad, Kragujevac, or Niš are seen as an opportunity for more balanced national development. The third—and most political—focuses on decentralization: even when a new capital is mentioned, respondents stress that ministries and power should not remain concentrated in one city, but should be distributed across Serbia.
The sample is gender-balanced (54.7% women; 45.3% men). Average age is 37.6 years, with a median of 34. It is also notable that a large share of respondents currently live in Belgrade (36.8% in the city center plus 4.3% in the outskirts), which may partly explain the stable support for the status quo.
The conclusion is straightforward: Belgrade remains the symbolic capital, but the underlying message is that if the “map” is to change, citizens are more interested in changing the model of governance than in moving the capital’s nameplate to a different city.