The survey “Is and when is dictatorship justified?” (January 2016, N=100) reveals an uncomfortable but important fact: a segment of respondents in Serbia sees dictatorship as a possible way out in times of crisis—provided it brings “order” and tangible results. However, society is fundamentally divided, and the single largest group remains opposed.
On the opening question—whether there are situations in which democratic procedures should be suspended and power handed to one person or a group—32% say “absolutely not.” In contrast, 27% say “absolutely yes,” while 20% choose “it depends.” A particularly notable 16% answer “we already have that,” suggesting a strong sense that democratic institutions are already weakened or largely formal. Another 4% have no opinion.
When dictatorship is tied to concrete goals, pragmatic willingness to “swallow” authoritarianism increases. The strongest support appears for dictatorship aimed at eliminating corruption and crime: 59% would accept it in some form (35% unconditionally + 24% with a parliamentary decision and/or a time limit), while 35% are against. A similar pattern appears for reducing unemployment: 59% “yes” in some form, 37% “no.” For legal security and respect for the law, 55% are ready to accept dictatorship, while 39% reject it. For economic development, support is 56%, opposition 40%.
However, when authoritarianism is linked to geopolitical goals, enthusiasm fades. For “dictatorship to speed up EU integration,” a clear majority say no (64%), and only 26% would accept it in some form. On “modernizing Serbia,” the split is 48% “yes” versus 44% “no.” For “keeping Kosovo within Serbia,” support is 43% “yes” (various versions) versus 43% “no,” with a high 14% having no opinion—an indicator of deep polarization and uncertainty.
Asked who they would accept as a “dictator,” the most selected option is “something else” (25.3%), and comments are full of “no one.” Among institutions, relatively higher trust goes to the Chief of the General Staff (9.64%), a “politician with the highest trust” and a “politician elected in elections” (8.43% each), followed by the Patriarch (7.83%). The President (6.02%), Prime Minister (6.63%), and the Prince (6.02%) score lower. The message is clear: even those who “conditionally” accept dictatorship do not easily see a legitimate person to implement it.
The sample is mostly female (57%), with an average age of about 39, and respondents are territorially dispersed (around 22% from Bačka and 22% from central Belgrade). Conclusion: citizens are normatively divided but functionally frustrated—and it is precisely that frustration that creates space for dictatorship to be imagined as a “technical fix,” especially against corruption. This is an alarm, not a recipe.