The online survey “Book of Impressions – RTS – 2024” (May 2024, N=410) provides a raw insight into how one segment of the audience perceives the public broadcaster. In first associations, heavy words dominate: “lie” (31), “propaganda” (8), “TV Bastille” (7), “regime television” (5), “darkness” (5), alongside direct links to “Vučić” and “SNS.” This vocabulary is not just a political message—it signals a deep rupture of trust and a feeling that RTS is not fulfilling the role of a public service broadcaster.
Viewership: formal presence, substantive boycott. When asked how many hours per day they watch RTS, the median is only 0.05 hours, and the most frequent answer is “0” (206). The average is 0.63 hours, but even that is inflated by extreme entries (maximum 15). In short: most participants practically do not watch RTS, even though the topic clearly affects them.
What do they still watch? When RTS is “left on,” it is primarily quizzes and formats without politics: “Slagalica” (36+36), “Potera” (21), then “Sasvim prirodno,” “SAT,” “Kvadratura kruga,” and sports. The most common answer, however, is still “none” (42) or “I don’t watch.” The message is clear: the audience draws a line between entertainment/cultural content and the news–political program, which they experience as problematic.
Program ratings: news at the bottom. RTS’s news programming receives a devastating assessment: 79.60% rate it “very bad,” plus another 12.44% “bad.” The political program is similar: 85.21% “very bad.” Entertainment is also mostly negative (46.15% “very bad”). Cultural programming is somewhat more nuanced: “average” is most common (31.08%), with 15.29% “good” and 3.51% “very good,” but also a substantial negative block. Sports is the only segment with a more “normal” distribution (33.83% “average,” 10.20% “good”), alongside many “no opinion” responses (26.87%).
Faces of RTS: “none.” In answers about journalists/hosts, the most frequent response is “none,” “nobody,” “not a single one,” with occasional names singled out (Memedović, Stanković). Even when someone is praised, the praise often comes with notes about pressure and the “cage” of editorial policy.
What would they change? The most common proposal is: “everything” (78). Still, across comments a few concrete demands repeat: depoliticizing the news program, replacing management and editors, more pluralism, more children’s/educational/cultural content, less of “one man” dominating programming, and a clear ban on party control over editorial policy.
The subscription paradox: 83.05% say they pay the fee regularly, but many explain it is “because they have to,” since the charge is tied to the electricity bill. That is where the key rupture appears: citizens feel like mandatory financiers of a media outlet they do not experience as “theirs.”
This sample is not representative of all of Serbia, but it is valuable as a “temperature check” of one part of the public: RTS is seen here as an institution without trust—and that is why many, despite paying, effectively switch it off.