The online survey “(Conspiracy) Theories!” (tvojstav.com, 25 August 2013, N≈251) suggests a pattern long recognisable in Serbia: the “heavier” and more institutionally sensitive a topic is, the lower the willingness to believe the official version—while conspiracy theories emerge as substitute explanations, often simpler and more emotionally persuasive.
Two “red points” of distrust: 9/11 and the assassination of Đinđić
The strongest resistance to official narratives is recorded for events that symbolise power and security. Only 19.12% of respondents believe the official version of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, while 56.18% do not. Regarding the assassination of Zoran Đinđić, 49.40% do not believe the official version, while 21.51% do.
These results suggest that some participants view major events as arenas of “hidden actors” and insufficiently transparent decisions. When trust in institutions is weak, official explanations stop functioning as a form of “closing the story”—and alternative narratives become plausible, even when they lack evidence that would meet investigative standards.
A broader frame: “a plan against Serbia”—7 out of 10 agree fully or partly
Especially indicative is the geopolitical interpretation: to the statement “Everything bad the West does to Serbia is part of some plan,” 37.45% answer “yes” and 33.86% “partly”—a total of 71.31%. In a similar vein, 39.84% believe that Milošević and Tuđman were supported by the West in the breakup of Yugoslavia, with 21.91% partly agreeing.
This suggests that conspiracy theories are not tied only to individual events, but also to a stable “world-explanation frame”: external powers are the actors, and Serbia is the object of a plan. Such a frame then easily absorbs new stories—because they fit an already established picture.
Scientific topics: more agreement, plus the paradox of “lab-origin” disease claims
Interestingly, respondents show a relatively high willingness to accept the reality of global warming: 58.57% say “yes” and 25.50% “partly.” However, the claim that AIDS/HIV originated and was “released” from a laboratory receives even stronger support: 61.35% “yes” and 17.13% “partly.”
This paradox can be read as a broader pattern: even when there is readiness to accept a scientific phenomenon (climate), there can simultaneously be a tendency toward explanations that assume intention, control, and a “hidden hand” (the laboratory). In that sense, conspiracies are not the opposite of science, but a substitute for complexity: it is easier to blame “something/someone” than to follow long chains of causation.
The Moon, Tito, Diana: division and a large share of “no opinion”
The Moon landing divides the sample: 48.21% believe it happened, 27.09% do not, and 15.94% partly agree. On the claim that Tito was not born in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, responses are nearly split (34.26% “yes,” 30.28% “no”), with 21.91% saying “no opinion.” On the question about Draga Mašin, almost half have no opinion (47.01%).
Such topics often function as a “cultural zone” of conspiracy theories: they are less tied to immediate political preferences and more to identity, storytelling tradition, and entertainment—which may explain the large share of undecided respondents.
EU and NATO: EU narrowly split, NATO clearly rejected
In the same sample, EU membership divides respondents (38.25% in favour, 41.04% against, 20.72% undecided), while NATO is clearly rejected (64.68% against, 14.47% in favour). In the context of strong acceptance of the idea that “the West has a plan,” this attitude toward NATO appears as an expected continuation of geopolitical distrust.
Who responded—and what this means
The sample is almost gender-balanced (51.39% men, 48.61% women), with a median age of 29; students/pupils make up one third of participants (33.47%). Most identify as religious believers (65.34%), and regionally Vojvodina and Belgrade dominate.
It is important to emphasise: this was an online survey from 2013, and the findings are indicative for the participants, not necessarily for the population as a whole. Still, the pattern observed—distrust in official versions of key events and a strong “plan” frame—aligns with a broader social sense that truth is often not transparent and institutions are not persuasive.