The “Survey on fears” (July 2016, N=113) presents an unusual combination: most respondents say they are generally satisfied with their own lives (46.9%), while only 4.4% report being completely satisfied. A further 27.4% describe their satisfaction as “average,” and those who are “a little” or “not at all” satisfied make up about a fifth of the sample in total (19.5%). In short: moderate optimism dominates, without any euphoria.
The most interesting part of the survey is the map of phobias—viewed from two angles: fears in one’s surroundings and fears in oneself. Among “people I socialize with,” health-related fears are the most visible: cancerophobia is present “to a great extent” in 11.5% of respondents’ surroundings, while nosophobia (fear of illness in general) reaches 12.4% “to a great extent.” Everyday-life fears are also noticeable: hematophobia (blood) appears “to a great extent” in 7.1% of the surroundings, while claustrophobia and nyctophobia are more often reported in milder forms (“to a small extent” or “moderately”).
When respondents speak about their personal fears, the picture is “calmer,” but still with a clear health-related peak. The highest “to a great extent” share is recorded for cancerophobia—10.6%, followed by thanatophobia (fear of death)—8.9%, and cardiophobia (fear of heart disease)—8.0%. Aerophobia (fear of flying) is marginal (2.7% “to a great extent”), while agoraphobia, hypophobia, hodophobia, and similar phobias are absent for the vast majority (often more than 80% reporting “not at all”). It is also notable that xenophobia, defined here as a “pathological hatred of foreigners,” is almost invisible among respondents: 79.7% say “not at all,” and only 0.9% “to a great extent.”
A political “thermometer” at the end of the survey suggests distance from elections: 39.8% are undecided, and 27.4% say they would not vote. Combined, that places more than two thirds of the sample in a zone of apathy or uncertainty. Among those who did choose an option, no single one dominates: the highest shares go to “Dosta je bilo” (9.7%) and SNS (8.0%), while the rest are in single digits.
The conclusion is clear: within an atmosphere of moderate life satisfaction, the deepest fears are not political or social—they are health-related. Cancer, death, and illness remain the “quiet peak” of collective anxiety, while politics is marked mainly by withdrawal.
Methodological note: The results should be read as indicative, since this is an online survey with a relatively small sample (N=113) and no proof of representativeness (no information on recruitment, response rate, or weighting). In addition, part of the questionnaire measures perceived fears in one’s environment (“among people I socialize with”), which is an indirect indicator dependent on respondents’ impressions. Also, the “phobia” terms used are not clinical diagnoses but self-assessments/intuitive assessments, so the findings do not describe medically confirmed disorders. Finally, the political question (“if elections were tomorrow”) placed within such a questionnaire can introduce a context effect and influence how respondents interpret the preceding items.
Veronauka u školama: Srbija podeljena između sekularizma i „posebnog statusa“ crkve Anketa „Veronauka u školama (i dalje) u Srbiji?“ (januar 2016, N=230) pokazuje da se rasprava o veronauci ne vodi samo oko jednog školskog predmeta, već oko šire dileme: da li Srbija treba da bude strogo sekularna država ili država sa privilegovanim položajem tradicionalnih verskih zajednica. Ispitanici su daleko najbolje informisani o Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi: ukupno 46,1% tvrdi da je upoznato „potpuno“ ili „uglavnom“, dok je kod drugih zajednica dominantno slabo poznavanje (npr. za jevrejsku zajednicu čak 55,2% kaže „nimalo“, a za islamsku 40,9%). Drugim rečima, javna percepcija religije u Srbiji najčešće se formira kroz „pravoslavnu prizmu“. Kada je reč o položaju verskih zajednica, većina bira liberalniji model: 58,7% smatra da sve verske zajednice treba da imaju ista prava, ukoliko ne krše zakone. Ipak, značajan deo građana ide u suprotnom smeru: 20% podržava ideju državne religije (pravoslavlja), a 7,4% bi dalo posebna prava samo tradicionalnim zajednicama. Sa druge strane spektra, 13,9% zagovara ukidanje prava verskog organizovanja – što govori o postojanju snažnog antiklerikalnog impulsa. Religijska praksa je neujednačena: 19,6% kaže da nikada nije prisustvovalo obredu, a 27,4% se ne seća kada je poslednji put bilo na službi. Istovremeno, u uzorku je 50,4% pravoslavaca, ali i visok udeo ateista (30,4%) i agnostika (7,0%) – što objašnjava zašto tema veronauke izaziva oštre podele. Na najosetljivijem pitanju – da li je uvođenje veronauke suprotno Ustavu jer narušava sekularni karakter države – rezultati su gotovo „mrtva trka“: 40,9% kaže „da“, 38,3% „ne“, a 13,9% nema stav. Još je jasniji skepticizam prema efektima veronauke: 47,4% smatra da ona ne doprinosi verskoj toleranciji, dok „da“ kaže 29,6%. Kompromisna ideja – uvesti predmet o religijama, ali da ga ne predaju predstavnici verskih zajednica – dobija mešovitu podršku: 56,5% je „za“ ili „delimično za“, ali 33,5% je protiv. Istovremeno, 45,7% izričito tvrdi da se versko obrazovanje ne treba odvijati u javnim školama (naspram 39,1% koji se ne slažu). Zanimljivo, ideja posebnog predmeta o ateizmu nema većinsku podršku: 63,5% je protiv, a samo 26,5% „za“ ili „delimično za“. To sugeriše da deo javnosti želi da religija bude prisutna kao kulturna tema, ali ne i da se škola pretvori u ideološki „ring“. Kada se priča spusti na roditeljsku odluku, razlike postaju još vidljivije: 16,5% kaže da dete ide na veronauku, 18,3% bi ga upisalo, ali 27,8% tvrdi da ga ne bi upisalo čak i da ga ima. Veliki deo odgovora insistira na slobodi izbora deteta – što se nameće kao minimalni zajednički imenitelj u društvu koje o ulozi religije nema konsenzus. Veronauka u školama: Srbija podeljena između sekularizma i „posebnog statusa“ crkve Anketa „Veronauka u školama (i dalje) u Srbiji?“ (januar 2016, N=230) pokazuje da se rasprava o veronauci ne vodi samo oko jednog školskog predmeta, već oko šire dileme: da li Srbija treba da bude strogo sekularna država ili država sa privilegovanim položajem tradicionalnih verskih zajednica. Ispitanici su daleko najbolje informisani o Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi: ukupno 46,1% tvrdi da je upoznato „potpuno“ ili „uglavnom“, dok je kod drugih zajednica dominantno slabo poznavanje (npr. za jevrejsku zajednicu čak 55,2% kaže „nimalo“, a za islamsku 40,9%). Drugim rečima, javna percepcija religije u Srbiji najčešće se formira kroz „pravoslavnu prizmu“. Kada je reč o položaju verskih zajednica, većina bira liberalniji model: 58,7% smatra da sve verske zajednice treba da imaju ista prava, ukoliko ne krše zakone. Ipak, značajan deo građana ide u suprotnom smeru: 20% podržava ideju državne religije (pravoslavlja), a 7,4% bi dalo posebna prava samo tradicionalnim zajednicama. Sa druge strane spektra, 13,9% zagovara ukidanje prava verskog organizovanja – što govori o postojanju snažnog antiklerikalnog impulsa. Religijska praksa je neujednačena: 19,6% kaže da nikada nije prisustvovalo obredu, a 27,4% se ne seća kada je poslednji put bilo na službi. Istovremeno, u uzorku je 50,4% pravoslavaca, ali i visok udeo ateista (30,4%) i agnostika (7,0%) – što objašnjava zašto tema veronauke izaziva oštre podele. Na najosetljivijem pitanju – da li je uvođenje veronauke suprotno Ustavu jer narušava sekularni karakter države – rezultati su gotovo „mrtva trka“: 40,9% kaže „da“, 38,3% „ne“, a 13,9% nema stav. Još je jasniji skepticizam prema efektima veronauke: 47,4% smatra da ona ne doprinosi verskoj toleranciji, dok „da“ kaže 29,6%. Kompromisna ideja – uvesti predmet o religijama, ali da ga ne predaju predstavnici verskih zajednica – dobija mešovitu podršku: 56,5% je „za“ ili „delimično za“, ali 33,5% je protiv. Istovremeno, 45,7% izričito tvrdi da se versko obrazovanje ne treba odvijati u javnim školama (naspram 39,1% koji se ne slažu). Zanimljivo, ideja posebnog predmeta o ateizmu nema većinsku podršku: 63,5% je protiv, a samo 26,5% „za“ ili „delimično za“. To sugeriše da deo javnosti želi da religija bude prisutna kao kulturna tema, ali ne i da se škola pretvori u ideološki „ring“. Kada se priča spusti na roditeljsku odluku, razlike postaju još vidljivije: 16,5% kaže da dete ide na veronauku, 18,3% bi ga upisalo, ali 27,8% tvrdi da ga ne bi upisalo čak i da ga ima. Veliki deo odgovora insistira na slobodi izbora deteta – što se nameće kao minimalni zajednički imenitelj u društvu koje o ulozi religije nema konsenzus.
Religious education in schools: Serbia divided between secularism and the “special status” of the Church
The survey “Religious Education in Schools (Still) in Serbia?” (January 2016, N=230) shows that the debate over religious education is not only about one school subject, but about a broader dilemma: should Serbia be a strictly secular state, or a state in which traditional religious communities enjoy a privileged position?
Respondents are by far best informed about the Serbian Orthodox Church: a total of 46.1% say they are “fully” or “mostly” familiar with it, while knowledge of other communities is predominantly low (for example, 55.2% say “not at all” for the Jewish community, and 40.9% for Islam). In other words, public perceptions of religion in Serbia are most often formed through an “Orthodox prism.”
Regarding the status of religious communities, most respondents choose a more liberal model: 58.7% believe all religious communities should have equal rights as long as they do not violate the law. Still, a significant share moves in the opposite direction: 20% support the idea of a state religion (Orthodoxy), and 7.4% would grant special rights only to “traditional” communities. On the other end of the spectrum, 13.9% argue for abolishing the right to religious organizing, indicating a strong anti-clerical impulse in part of the sample.
Religious practice is uneven: 19.6% say they have never attended a religious service, and 27.4% cannot remember when they last did. At the same time, the sample includes 50.4% Orthodox Christians but also a high share of atheists (30.4%) and agnostics (7.0%), which helps explain why the topic of religious education produces sharp divisions.
On the most sensitive question—whether introducing religious education violates the Constitution by undermining the secular character of the state—the results are almost a dead heat: 40.9% say “yes,” 38.3% say “no,” and 13.9% have no opinion. Skepticism about outcomes is even clearer: 47.4% believe religious education does not contribute to religious tolerance, while 29.6% say it does.
A compromise proposal—introducing a subject about religions, but taught not by representatives of religious communities—receives mixed support: 56.5% are “in favor” or “partly in favor,” while 33.5% are against. At the same time, 45.7% explicitly state that religious education should not take place in public schools (versus 39.1% who disagree).
Notably, a separate subject on atheism does not win majority support: 63.5% oppose it, while only 26.5% are “in favor” or “partly in favor.” This suggests that part of the public may accept religion as a cultural topic, but does not want schools to become an ideological “ring.”
When the discussion shifts to parental decisions, differences become even more visible: 16.5% say their child attends religious education, 18.3% would enroll their child, while 27.8% say they would not enroll their child even if the option existed. Many responses emphasize the child’s freedom of choice—emerging as the smallest shared denominator in a society that has no consensus on the role of religion.