An online survey conducted immediately after the terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015, N=141) reveals three parallel strands of reaction: strong emotional distress, pronounced suspicion about the background of the events, and a preference for Serbia to stay out of bloc alignments.
Awareness of the attacks was almost universal: 99% of respondents had heard about the event, with 38.3% following it intensively and 36.2% moderately. Emotions were, as expected, heavy: 29.8% reported horror, 14.2% sadness, 12.8% helplessness, while 9.9% said they were frightened. Particularly striking, however, is the high share of indifferent respondents (18.4%)—a sign of fatigue from crisis news or a sense that global conflicts are “far away,” yet constantly present in the media. In addition, a smaller share translated their reaction into “revenge”—6.4% toward the West and 2.1% toward the Islamic State—indicating polarized interpretations.
The most interesting finding appears in the questions about who organized the attack and who inspired it. As the direct perpetrator, most respondents point to the Islamic State (52.5%), but a quarter believe it was “the Islamic State under the West’s control” (25.5%), while 16.3% directly blame U.S. services. When asked about the “inspirer,” suspicion toward the West grows: the United States is named as the inspirer by 37.6%, while the Islamic State is at 31.9%. In short, part of the public accepts the “executor” but looks for the “scriptwriter” elsewhere—a typical pattern of distrust in official narratives.
Normatively, the survey shows a clear distance from justifying violence: 68.8% neither justify it nor express understanding, and only 1.4% justify it. However, a quarter (24.1%) say, “I don’t justify it, but I understand it”—a space where criticism of Western interventions, fear of radicalization, and relativization of causes likely overlap.
Regarding Serbia’s policy toward the Islamic State, neutrality dominates (37.6%), alongside almost equally sized support for “softer” engagement: diplomatic activity (22.0%) and following Russia’s policy (21.3%). Support for an openly military stance is low (5.7%), as is aligning with the West (2.1%). Fear of spillover is notable: 44.7% believe an attack in Serbia is possible, while 31.2% are unsure.
Methodological note: The sample is online and self-selected; the findings are not representative of the overall population. In some questions, the offered response options and wording may encourage “theoretical” (conspiracy-style) interpretations, which should be considered when drawing conclusions.